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Abstract. A growing importance of public-private partnership (PPP) in public housing projects has drawn much attention. 
This paper presents a theoretical analysis exploring the effect of the public target on the private’s optimal strategy in a PPP 
housing project. An option-based model is established to show that an increase in the proportion of public housing will 
delay the project development. It indicates that the government needs to consider the trade-off between the waiting time 
and the supply of public housing. On the other hand, due to the delay effect, the expected project value would rise because 
the private developer is willing to wait for a better environment in the presence of a rise in public housing. Both private 
and public sector can benefit from this accurate evaluation model and its implications.
Keywords: housing supply, optimal development, project risk, public housing, public-private partnership.
Introduction
Public-private partnerships (PPPs) have been developed 
into an effective scheme for the provision of large-scale 
projects which become essential pillar for economic growth 
(Liu & Cheah, 2009). PPP, as a means to appeal for fund or 
to finance the project, has been successfully adopted in the 
development of asset-based industries, as well as in urban 
development. Within the PPP framework, public sector 
who takes the lead in large-scale projects for urban develop-
ment and redevelopment adopts market-led strategy (Dor-
mois, Pinson, & Reignier, 2005). Such a strategy inevitably 
brings about various risks due to its market-driven nature. 
As most of large-scale projects in the courses of urban de-
velopment and redevelopment have high risk profiles, both 
private and public sectors have great interest in balancing 
risk and return of the project (Leung & Hui, 2005).
Among various large-scale schemes in urban develop-
ment, the public housing is the one of most important so-
lutions to the local government and community as it offers 
a feasible remedy to housing inequality. Public housing 
plays a prominent part in many countries, either devel-
oped or developing ones, during their urban development 
and sprawl (Aurand, 2013). The local government adher-
ing to the long-term sustainability regards the provision of 
public housing services to the society as one of its aims. In 
a majority of cases, the government develops a parcel of 
empty land to facilitate public housing supply.
Normally, to alleviate its shortfall in financing and 
techniques, the government would seek appropriate part-
ner to develop the project (Cheah & Liu, 2006). In general, 
PPP as an efficient approach is applied to establish col-
laboration (Xu, Chan, & Yeung, 2010). In a typical PPP 
case, the public sector brings the land and offers ancillary 
funding acting as a promoter (Leung & Hui, 2005) and a 
principal driver (Barke & Clarke, 2015) while the private 
sector contributes their resources and professional skills 
(Yuan, Guang, Wang, Li, & Skibniewski, 2012). As usual, 
the private developer involved targets at profitability of the 
project. To attract private partners, the land is sold by the 
public sector at a discount rate to the private developer 
(Abdul-Aziz & Kassim, 2011). In return, the private devel-
oper is required to deliver the pre-agreed amount of pub-
lic housing and the private developer has some freedom 
to develop the rest of the land for private housing. This is 
the common collaboration mode in a PPP project which 
consists of both private and public housing.
The public sector’s promotion of such a PPP housing 
project builds on two main terms: the discount rate (or 
subsidy proportional to market price) for land acquisi-
tion and a target at the supply of public housing. As for 
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the public target, the local government usually sets up a 
target of public housing supply to comply with their long-
term urban planning. This target can be measured in the 
proportion of public housing to private housing in a PPP 
project.
In a PPP project, the private partner has to bear some 
risks which are transferred from public sector to private. 
With different levels of involvement and responsibility, 
PPP allocates risk on an agreed basis between the public 
and private sectors (Lim, Akintoye, Edwards, & Hardcas-
tle, 2005). Some of PPP applications have been proved to 
be inefficient due to various reasons including the under-
estimation of risks embedded in partnership (Chen & Do-
loi, 2008), inappropriate guarantee offered by government 
(Xu, Yeung, & Jiang, 2014), and confrontations among dif-
ferent parties (such as resistance from local communities, 
see Norris & Hearne, 2016). As such, the risk assessment 
is imperative to both public and private sectors for the 
success of PPP projects.
As discussed, PPP complicates the risk issues. On one 
hand, the private developer is confronted with the uncer-
tainty of investment lag (Bar-Ilan & Strange, 1996). On 
the other hand, the private sector has to evaluate the ad-
ditional risk brought by the public housing. Hence, the 
private developer has an urgent demand to understand 
the risks stemming from the public target under market 
uncertainty, in order to work out optimal strategy prior 
to project development. Furthermore, the optimal strat-
egy adopted by the private sector including the timing 
and quantity would affect the outcome of the project, and 
eventually the achievement of the public target.
Since PPP has been widely introduced to public hous-
ing programs (Kwak, Chih, & Ibbs, 2009; Li et al., 2014), 
there is a necessity to develop a more accurate valuation 
considering the impact of the public target for the private 
sectors. In addition, the implications of this valuation will 
serve as a reference for the public sector in their moni-
toring of public housing supply. As few of studies pays 
attention to the private developer’s optimal development 
strategy in PPP housing projects, this paper intends to in-
vestigate the impact of the public target on the private de-
veloper’s optimal strategy under market uncertainty, and 
further on the supply of public housing.
In a PPP housing project, the proportion of public 
housing affects the private developer’s decision in several 
aspects. First, the price of and demand for private housing 
can be affected by the nearby public housing. Public hous-
ing stands a chance of inducing poverty concentration in 
the neighbourhood (Massey & Kanaiaupuni, 1993; Jacob, 
2004) and even deteriorates the condition of poverty con-
centration (Hui, Zhong, & Yu, 2015). Government’s long-
term urban planning in terms of land use, especially for 
public housing, is always subject to social polarization 
of urban societies (Van Kempen, 1994). The residential 
segregation driven by polarization pushes forward urban 
poverty.
Second, urban development and redevelopment usu-
ally result in large-scale projects of public housing located 
in the area with relatively poor access to public services 
and amenities (Talen & Koschinsky, 2014). For instance, 
Hui et al. (2015) found that a new project of public hous-
ing is more likely to have inferior accessibility to business 
zone (such as CBD). Many housing studies suggest that 
the accessibility to CBD or transportation is a determinant 
factor in land value and house pricing (Heikkila et  al., 
1989). Thus the private housing prices of PPP project in a 
relative isolate area may suffer from the shortage of aux-
iliary facilities.
Third, some evidences are explored to support the 
price discovery between public and private housing (Ong 
& Sing, 2002). The price of private housing is found to 
be positively correlated with that of public sector. Thus, 
the proportion of public housing defined by the public 
target determines the supply of public housing in a pub-
lic-private project, which influences the pricing of public 
portion and eventually that of private portion. Besides, 
the construction costs of public housing proportionately 
count for the total construction costs. Thus, the propor-
tion of public sector contributes a substantial part to the 
developer’s financial burden.
We develop an option-based model for PPP housing 
projects subject to the proportion of public housing. By 
solving the model, we obtain the optimal strategy includ-
ing the supply of private housing, expected waiting time to 
develop and option value of project development for the 
private developer. The theoretical analysis based on the 
model is conducted to give insights into the effects of the 
public target on the private developer’s optimal decision 
making in PPP projects.
As previous studies largely concentrate on social and 
public aspects of decision-making rather than private sec-
tor (Leung & Hui, 2005), our model offers a fundamental 
analysis of the private developer’s developing strategy. The 
model implications can benefit the public and private sec-
tors in the negotiation of the partnership. In addition, the 
public sector (local government and related authorities) 
can take advantage of this study not only to foresee the 
supplies of public and private housing and relevant tim-
ing of provision, but also to balance the development of 
sub-markets.
Section 1 presents the theoretical model and Section 2 
provides the optimal strategies for private developer aris-
ing from the model. Section 3 discusses the effect of the 
public target on such optimal strategies. A numerical 
analysis is conducted in Section 4 and the conclusion is 
summarized in the final section.
1. The scenario and model construction
This section introduces the real option approach and then 
presents PPP scenario in private-public housing project 
and the model construction based on this scenario.
Real option approach is an extension of option pric-
ing framework for financial assets to real (no financial) 
assets (Titman, 1985). The framework models a series of 
decision-making at sequential future time points. At each 
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point, the decision maker decides whether or not to devel-
op/invest. Since Titman’s work, real option-based frame-
work has become a mature approach for the analysis of the 
feasibility of project investment under market uncertainty. 
This approach offers a more accurate appraisal method by 
which the developer can evaluate the relevant benefits and 
outlays in irreversible investments such as residential de-
velopment (Quigg, 1993). The merit of the real option ap-
proach is it can assess the added value of the flexibility the 
decision maker can have at each time (Li et al., 2014). Real 
option approach has been adopted in project valuation for 
a variety of PPP project including public housing (e.g. Ho, 
Hui, & Ibrahim, 2009; Li et al., 2014).
In PPP scenario similar to prevalent models adopted 
by many countries (see Abdul-Aziz & Kassim, 2011; Li 
et  al., 2014), the government provides a parcel of land 
at a discount rate and requests the private developer to 
construct for the purpose of public housing in return. In 
this case, the private developer endures the construction 
cost of public housing. The supply of public housing is in 
proportion to the supply of private housing in such a PPP 
project. As a housing project is irreversible and time-con-
suming, the private developer has to assess the project fea-
sibility through a project valuation prior to development. 
More specifically, the private developer looks for optimal 
strategy including the supply of housing, the timing for 
development and the expected project value (or profit).
The heterogeneity of housing products supplied in this 
project is defined by the location and project characteris-
tics. It makes this sub-market less perfectly competitive 
in the area. Hence, the developer is more likely to have 
monopoly power on the pricing of their private housing 
products in the area. Let Q denote the supply of private 
housing. The private house price is derived as a price func-
tion of the short-term supply and the long-term market 
trend (Quigg, 1993). We assume ( )P Xd Q=  where X is 
exogenous state variable reflecting the long-term trend 
and ( )d Q  measures the short-term supply.
In theory, the first derivative of price with regard to Q 
should be negative so that ( )d Q ʹ < 0. Since the developer 
is deemed as monopoly supplier in a local market, ( )d Q  
captures the response of price to local housing demand. 
In this study, the demand function is designed as a linear 
function shown as:
( )d Q m bQ= − , (1)
where: coefficient m > 0 is the intercept and b > 0 captures 
the sensitivity of price to demand. A greater coefficient b 
indicates a higher sensitivity of price to demand. The coef-
ficient b is assumed to be constant over developing period. 
In addition, house price evolves along with the long term 
trend proxied by the state variable X which follows a geo-




= a + σ , (2)
where: Xa  is the expected growth rate of X and Xσ  is the 
standard deviation of growth rate; dw denotes the incre-
ment of a standard Wiener process.
Public housing gives rise to poverty concentration 
(Massey & Kanaiaupuni, 1993) and even aggravate the 
neighbourhood poverty (Hui et al., 2015). When private 
housing is located near public housing, private house pric-
es are negatively affected by public housing mainly due to 
the effect of poverty concentration (Hui et al., 2015). In 
addition, private house prices are always positively corre-
lated with public housing (Ong & Sing, 2002). Hence, an 
increase in the proportion of public housing further dete-
riorates private house prices. As the project provides both 
public and private housing in this scenario, this model 
takes into account such effect in the project evaluation. 
That is, the expected private house prices should be nega-
tively adjusted by public housing nearby.
Let 0λ >  denotes the proportion of public housing 
which is the indicator of the public target). More specifi-
cally, λ indicates the ratio of public to private housing and 
thus supply of public housing is λQ. Assume the effect 
of public proportion on private housing prices depends 
on the ratio λ and can be depicted by a function ( )f λ . 
This function holds several properties: (i) monotonous de-
creasing as ( ) 0f − λ < ; (ii) ( )0 1f =  when 0λ = , which 
indicates that the effect is nil if no public housing nearby 
and then the model reduces to a classical/baseline model; 
(iii) ( )0 1f< λ < , which implies the depreciation effect 
of public housing on private housing prices. As such, the 
expected house price at time t + δ  adjusted by ( )f λ  is 
shown as:
( ) ( )t tP X d Q f+δ +δ= λ . (3)
For model simplicity, we assume ( ) ( )f expλ = −λ  and 
equation 3 becomes
( ) ( )t tP X d Q exp+δ +δ= −λ . (3’)
Generally, the supply of housing products Q and ratio 
of public sector λ in such the PPP housing project have 
to be assigned prior to the development commencement. 
The intrinsic value of the PPP project at time t could be 
determined with the supply and the ratio of public hous-
ing. Assume the developing period is δ and thus the new 
houses can be sold at time t + δ.
The total cost of project development1, ( )C Q , depends 
on the supply, can be formulated as ( )C Q cQ c Qλ= + λ  
where c is the cost of private sector and cλ  is the cost 
of public sector with c cλ ≤ . In this case, as the private 
developer produces the public housing for government 
for free, the real construction cost becomes c cλ+ λ . As-
sociated with the total cost function, the intrinsic value 
denoted by v should be the expectation at time t ( tE ) of 
the project profit, expressed as:
( ) ( ) ( )v t t t t tX E e P Q C Q e E P Q C Q−ρδ −ρδ+δ +δ = − = −     , 
(4)
1 Usually the total cost contains two parts: the fixed cost and 
variable cost dependent on the supply amount. In this model 
the fixed cost is neglected for the model simplicity as it will 
not affect the outcome and implication of model.
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where: ρ denotes the capital cost. Equation (4) shows a 
typical case in option-based analysis of project evalua-
tion. It indicates that the private developer waits for the 
optimal timing (denoted by T) on project development, 
aiming at the optimal present value of expected earnings. 
In addition, at the optimal time (t = T) the intrinsic value 
denoted by ( )v TX  can be shown in the form of
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )v   T T TX E e P Q f C Q−ρδ +δ = λ − 
( ) ( )T Te E X m bQ Q e cQ c Q−ρδ −λ+δ λ = − − + λ 
( ) ( ) ( )X Te X m bQ Qe cQ c Q− ρ−a δ −λ λ= − − + λ . (5)
As such, at any time t (t < T), the value of project (de-
noted by V) is subject to the expected value in accordance 
with the optimal timing (T) of development. That is
( ) ( ) ( ){ }V max v T tt t TTX E X e−ρ − =   . (6)
2. Optimal project development
This section gives the analytical solution to the model. The 
optimal decisions on project development including op-
timal supply and optimal timing to develop are obtained 
through the model solution. First, the optimal supply of 
private housing ( TQ ) in this PPP project can be derived 
from the first-order condition:




e X m bQ e c c
Q
− ρ−a δ −λ
λ
∂
= − − + λ =
∂
.
Thus, the optimal supply TQ  can be calculated as:
( )
( ) ( )2 22 2X X
T
T T
c c em m CeQ
b bbX e bX e
λ λλ
− ρ−a δ − ρ−a δ
+ λ
= − = − , (7)
where: C c cλ= + λ  denotes the real unit construction cost. 
The above formula suggests that if TQ  exists, 0TQ > . This 







− ρ−a δ −λ
+ λ
. 
Since the coefficient  m as the y-intercept in inverse de-
mand function indicates the unacceptable housing price 
which excesses the maximum affordability in the society, 
this formula gives a lower bound of coefficient m.
Based on equation 7, the intrinsic value of project de-
velopment can be calculated by:
( )






m X e e C e e mCX
b bX b
− ρ−a δ ρ−a δ−λ λ
= + − . 
(8)
Another concern in project valuation is to determine 
the optimal timing of development. To fulfil this objective, 
the partial equilibrium equation is derived to explore the 
marginal change in project option value. The optimal tim-
ing is revealed through solving this equation. Following 
the framework of real option analysis, the expected incre-
ment in the option value should be equal to the expected 
return which is brought by investing the capital with same 
amount as the option value into the market. As such, the 
differential equation is shown as:
( )V V .tE d X dt  = ρ 
By applying the Ito’s lemma, the instant change in op-
tion value is:
( ) ( )21V V V V
2t X X X XX X X X
d X X X dt X dw = a + σ + σ   
 
 .
As discussed, the trigger of optimal development is 
determined by TX . When TX X<  or t T< , the option 
value of project should satisfy a second order differential 
equation:
( )21V V V
2X X X XX
X Xρ = a + σ , (9)
with the initial-condition ( )V 0 0= . Two boundary condi-
tions should be satisfied to solve the differential equation. 
They are value matching and smooth pasting conditions. 
First, the continuity of the value function enforces the 
value-matching condition shown as:
( ) ( )V   vT TX X= ,
where: ( )v TX  is the intrinsic value of project develop-
ment given by equation 8. The other is smooth pasting 
condition to pin down the free boundary of differential 
equation defined as:
( ) ( )V   vX T X TX X= .
Based on equation 8, smooth pasting condition is 
shown as:
( )









m e e C e eX
b b X
− ρ−a δ ρ−a δ−λ λ
= − . (10)
Following the solving process of real option (cf. Dixit 
& Pindyck, 1994), the project value at time t subject to two 
boundary conditions can be shown as:
( ) ( )
( )
* ,  V ,






V X X X
X X X
V X X X











 a a ρ
κ = − + − +  σ σ σ 
. The coef-
ficient κ  reveals the sensitivity of the project value to 
the exogenous state variable X. In addition, the term 
( )/ TX X
κ  can be considered as stochastic discount fac-
tor in this option pricing framework. The law of one price 
suggested by the existence of stochastic discount factor 
promises the uniqueness of option-based value of project 
development (Wong, 2007).
Based on equations (9–11), the trigger of project de-
velopment can be calculated as:













The above equation indicates that if trigger TX  exists, 
0TX >  which requires that 1κ >  and thus requires the 
expected return of local housing market should excess the 
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expected state growth of state variable, i.e. Xρ > a . The 
relationship between two rates implies a risk premium. In 
addition, the increase in such risk premium (the disparity 
between ρ  and Xa ) leads κ  to a larger value according 
to the two inequalities:
/ 0∂κ ∂ρ >  and / 0X∂κ ∂a < .








while substituting TX  into equation (8), the optimal in-











By solving the model under the uncertainty, the results 
indicate that the project developer should wait when the 
exogenous state variable t TX X< . Otherwise, the devel-
oper should commence the project development with the 
optimal supply given by equation (13). At the moment, 
the intrinsic value of project development is determined 
by equation (14).
Given the initial value of state variable 0X  at time 0 
(suppose 0 TX X< , otherwise the developer should invest 
immediately), by integrating the probability density func-
tion of waiting time until the first arrival of trigger TX  











E t X X =   a − σ
. (15)
Note that the above equation requires the presumption 
of 20.5X Xa > σ . In fact, as X follows a geometric Brown-
ian motion, this presumption is guaranteed to have a posi-
tive drift in Brownian motion. Equation (15) reveals the 
positive correlation of the expected waiting time to the 
trigger value, taking all other parameters ( 0 , ,X XX a σ ) as 
constants. It indicates that lower trigger value can shorten 
the waiting time to develop.
The land policy may compel the private developer to 
be in face of a penalty, even an adjudication of land los-
ing, if the acquired land has been idle over the stipulated 
period2. In the case that local government sells land to 
developers, the contract of land leasing restricts the maxi-
mum length of waiting time to develop. That is, on the 
perspective of option pricing, there is a finite expiry pe-
riod for option of project development. Note that there is 
no analytical solution to such scenario, but an asymptotic 
solution of the trigger value can be calculated by using 
numerical calculation. As the main purpose of this study 
is to investigate the effects of proportion of public hous-
ing on optimal decision for PPP project development, it 
2 Such policy is implemented in some countries/regions, especially in 
those markets which are focusing on urbanization. For instance, main-
land China and Hong Kong put such policy into practice in their land 
markets.
has trivial impact if the model relaxes the limitation on 
expiry. As it is convenient if the project development is 
considered as a perpetual option, the following discussion 
neglects the finite expiry N.
3. The effect of public supply
Due to the lack of studies focusing on the effect of pub-
lic supply on the private developer’s optimal decision in 
project development, this section conducts a series of 
comparative static analysis to reveal the correlations of 
proportion of public housing to the optimal timing, op-
timal private housing supply and project value, taking all 
other parameters ( 0 , , , , , ,X XX c cλ δ ρ a σ ) as constant. This 
analysis could serve as a fundamental guide on optimal 
development in public-private housing project, on which 
further studies can build.
Firstly we examine the effects of proportion of public 
housing (proxied by λ) on the trigger XT and optimal time 
for project development. These two terms evolve in the 
tandem as differentiating expected waiting time (equation 





T T X X
E t E t X X
X X
∂ ∂    ∂ ∂   = =
∂λ ∂ ∂λ ∂λa − σ
,
which shows a positive correlation. As such, the effect of 
proportion of public housing on these two terms should 
have the same signs. Then we differentiate the trigger TX  
(equation 12) with regard to λ and yields:
( ) ( )










= + λ +
∂λ κ −
.
As all the terms are positive, the above equation indi-
cates that / 0TX∂ ∂λ >  and thus / 0E t∂ ∂λ >   . The ratio 
of public housing λ holds a positive effect on the trigger 
TX  showing that a rise in proportion of public sector 
leads to a higher trigger of state variable and thus a higher 
expectation of waiting time to develop. In other words, the 
private developer would delay the project development in 
the face of higher proportion of public housing. This leads 
to remark 1.
Remark 1. The ratio of public housing λ has a delay 
effect on project development in PPP residential project.
The main reason to such delay is that the private de-
veloper prefers waiting for a higher trigger value by the 
delay as a higher trigger value reflects a better external en-
vironment and also indicates higher private housing prices 
(refers to equation 3). For this reason, delay would benefit 
the private developer confronted with a higher proportion 
of public housing.
Second, we investigate the effect of proportion of pub-
lic housing on the supply of private housing in PPP pro-
ject. Take differentiate on equation 13 with respect to ratio 
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which shows a trivial correlation between private housing 
supply and ratio of public housing. In other words, the 
change in the proportion (or the ratio) of public hous-
ing takes no impacts on the private supply. This leads to 
remark 2.
Remark 2. The proportion of public housing does not 
affect the private housing supply in a PPP housing project.
The intuition of this remark is as follows. We can use 
equation 7 to reveal the different channel through which 
the proportion of public housing affects the private hous-
ing supply. Differentiate the supply with regard to the pro-
portion of public housing and have:
( ) ( ) ( ), , ,T T T T T T T
T
Q X Q X Q X X
X
∂ λ ∂ λ ∂ λ ∂
= +
∂λ ∂λ ∂ ∂λ
,
where: 































The above equation reveals that the total effect can be 
decomposed into two parts. The first term on the right 
hand side demonstrates a direct effect of proportion of 
public housing on the optimal supply which indicates that 
a higher proportion of public housing could cause a de-
crease in private housing supply. In other words, it reflects 
that public housing could crowd out the private housing 
in local market. On the other hand, the second term on 
the right hand side demonstrates a complex indirect effect 
of proportion of public housing through the trigger value 
(waiting time). This indirect effect consists of two compo-









. A higher 
trigger value indicates a better state so as to give a rise in 
the expected housing prices which drives the developer to 
supply more. Second, as mentioned in remark 1, propor-
tion of public housing has a delay effect on the optimal 
project development. On the basis of the first aspect, the 
private developer is more likely to wait in order to take 
advantage of higher expected housing prices. In total, the 
indirect effect can alleviate the crowding out effect. In a 
sum, the direct effect is crowding out effect while the in-
direct effect is delay effect. As / 0TQ∂ ∂λ = , it implies that 
these two effects cancel out each other and has a zero-sum 
effect eventually.
Finally, it is of interest to investigate the effect of pro-
portion of public housing on the intrinsic value of project 
development in PPP project. Take differentiate on equa-










As 1κ > , the above equation indicates that v / 0T∂ ∂λ > . 
Therefore, a higher proportion of public housing induces a 
higher project value. This leads to remark 3.
Remark 3. The proportion of public housing λ posi-
tively affects the intrinsic value of PPP project.
This may be counter-intuitive since usually people 
think a large scale of public housing near the private 
property would deteriorate the value of private property 
(Hui et al., 2015). The intuition is as follows. Similarly, this 
total effect of λ can be decomposed into three parts, i.e. 
direct and indirect effects. Differentiate the project value 
defined by equation 5 with regard to the proportion of 
public housing and yield:
( ) ( )
( ) ( )
v , , v , ,
v , , v , ,
T T T T T T
T T T T T TT T
T T
Q X Q X
Q X Q XQ X
Q X
∂ λ ∂ λ
= +
∂λ ∂λ
∂ λ ∂ λ∂ ∂
+
∂ ∂λ ∂ ∂λ
,
where:
( ) ( ) ( )
v , ,
0XT T T T T T T
Q X
e e X m bQ Q c Q− ρ−a δ−λ λ
∂ λ





( ) ( ) ( )
v , ,
2XT T T T T
T
Q X







( ) ( ) ( )
v , ,
0XT T T T T
T
Q X







The first term reflects the direct effect of proportion 
of public housing. It shows that λ has a negative direct 
effect on the value of project development as an increase 
in the proportion would reduce the housing price and also 
give rise to the real construction cost. The second term 
indicates an indirect effect through the channel of opti-
mal supply of private housing. This term can be ignored 
with reference to Remark 2. The last term indicates an 
indirect effect through the trigger value of state variable. 
Inequality 








 implies that trigger value 
positively affects the project value. As multiplied by the 
delay effect (refers to Remark 1), this indirect effect shows 
a positive correlation of project value to the proportion. 
From Remark 3, the total effect is positive implies that 
the indirect effect brought by the delay effect overwhelms 
the direct effect. In other words, the private developer is 
willing to wait longer for a higher trigger value in order 
to offset the direct negative impacts of public housing on 
this PPP project.
Note that if the private developer is confronted with 
a limitation of waiting time, they may not be able to op-
timally develop the project. A sub-optimal strategy is to 
wait as long as possible, i.e. to commence the development 
on the last minute.
4. Numerical analysis and discussion
A numerical analysis is conduced to offer a more straight-
forward illustration than the mathematical expression. By 
applying equations 12, 14 and 15, the value of trigger and 
the expected waiting time to develop, as well as the opti-
mal project value are calculated and plotted in Figures 1–3 
respectively with regard to different proportions of public 
housing in a range of [0.10, 2]. Note that, λ (lambda) rep-
resents the ratio of public to private housing. For instance, 
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value of 2 for λ indicates the supply of public housing is 
twice as the supply of private housing.
Table 1 shows the values assigned to the parameters 
in our analysis. For sensitivity of price to supply, we set 
1.10 as many countries have the value larger than 1 (see 
Caldera & Johansson, 2013). Parameter  m and is ran-
domly selected as it is a constant and matters little in this 
analysis. The expected market performance including ex-
pected market return, expected growth rate and standard 
deviation of the state variable are set up according to the 
reasonable values selected from Titman (1985) and Quigg 
(1993), to mimic a common property market. We set the 
variable cost for private housing to a unit and proportion-
ally set public housing costs. The ratio is close to the value 
suggested by Li et al. (2014). The construction period of 
project and the initial value of state variable are selected 
randomly in unitisation. For instance, value of 2 for con-
struction period means project development takes 2 units 
of time periods.
As we employ unitised value for the most of param-
eters, the values on y-axis shown in the following figures 
themselves are of no meaning. The figures are used to 
show the patterns of the relationships corresponding to 
different proportions of public housing.
In general, the trigger value, the expected waiting time 
and the project value increase with proportion. For the 
charts of trigger value and optimal waiting time, Figures 
1 and 2 display two upward nonlinear curves. These two 
curves echo with the implications from our theoretical 
model. An increase in the proportion of public housing 
leads to a larger trigger value and thus the private devel-
oper intends to wait for a better economic environment 
(indicated by the trigger) to alleviate the expected market 
uncertainty.
More specifically, Figure 1 displays an obvious convex 
curve of trigger value while Figure 2 shows a slightly con-
cave curve of expected waiting time, with respect to the 
public target. Such the concave pattern implies that a unit 
Figure 1. The plot of the trigger value against the proportion of 
public housing (lamda)
Figure 2. The plot of the expected waiting time against the 
proportion of public housing (lamda)
Table 1. The setting of parameters in the numerical analysis
Variable Equation Description Value
m 1 Intercept in the inverse demand 
function
3.20
b 1 Slope in the inverse demand 
function
1.10
aX 2 Expected growth rate of state 
variable
0.06
σX 2 Expected standard deviation of 
state variable
0.20
ρ 4 Expected market return rate or 
discount rate
0.12
c 4 Variable cost for private housing 1.00
cλ 4 Variable cost for public housing 0.85
δ 4 Development/construction 
period for the PPP project
2.00
X0 15 Initiation of state variable 1.50
Figure 3. The plot of the project value against the proportion of 
public housing (lamda)
change (1%) in the proportion of public housing when 
such the proportion is low, brings about more impacts on 
time delay than that when such the proportion is high. In 
other words, if the supply plan of public housing is sensi-
tive to time, the local government should not adjust the 
proportion when the initial proportion is at a low level.
Figure 3 shows a linear relationship between the pro-
ject value and the proportion of public housing. Although 
an increase in the proportion of public housing dampens 
the private house prices and depreciates the whole project, 
the private developer has to wait for a long time for a bet-
ter environment to compensate that negative impact.
From the perspective of the private developers, they 
are keen to know whether it is worth levelling up the pro-
portion of public housing as they understand the increase 
in proportion of public housing would lead to a higher 
intrinsic project value. Figure 4 illustrates a nonlinear 
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relationship between waiting time and project value at 
each point of proportion from 10% through 199%. A con-
cave curve indicates that a margin benefit of project value 
requires less waiting time. In other words, a unit increase 
in waiting time would bring more margin gain in project 
value. Theoretically speaking, developers are willing to 
take higher proportion and to wait longer time if possible.
PPP approach has been widely adopted in many coun-
tries (Abdul-Aziz & Kassim, 2011) and exhibited large po-
tential to improve public housing supply (Li et al., 2014). 
However, this approach does provide an efficient way but 
can not be a panacea since the private profit is the most 
critical factor that hinders the implementation of PPP in a 
public housing project (Yuan et al., 2012). Our model and 
findings reveal how the private sector optimises the strat-
egy on the basis of the expected profit. The finding shows 
that the private sector can benefit from the postponement 
of the development. This echoes with the value of deferral 
option verified in Li et  al. (2014). For the public sector, 
the local government on one hand has to fulfil the pub-
lic target and on the other hand, has to get private sector 
involved effectively in such PPP projects, in order to have 
a sustainable development of public housing in the long 
run (Li, Guo, You, & Hui, 2016). In addition, the findings 
demonstrate that for private developer, the waiting leads 
to a higher project value, which is consistent with the find-
ing of positive premium in Yao and Pretorius (2014). The 
delays in the supplies of both public and private housing 
may also stimulate house prices. By contrary, following the 
spirit of Hui et al. (2015), the delay postpones an insult 
to injury – the poverty concentration in a developed area 
may get deferred by not developing public housing at the 
moment. In light of the above discussion, the public sec-
tor should adopt a proper strategy to balance social needs 
and the progress dominated by private sector, which is the 
key success factor as suggested in Leung and Hui (2005).
Conclusions
For sustainable supply of public housing, local govern-
ment intends to apply public-private partnership (PPP) to 
alleviate its shortfall in finance and techniques by inviting 
appropriate private partner to develop the joint project 
which supplies both private and public housing. To pur-
sue profit from PPP project, the private developer needs 
to understand project risks under market uncertainty in-
cluding the risk arising from the public target, in order to 
make optimal decision prior to project development. As 
previous studies largely concentrate on social and public 
aspects rather than private sector decision making (Leung 
& Hui, 2005), this paper provides a theoretical analysis 
to benefit both the public and private sectors by having 
a profound understanding of how the public target (i.e. 
the proportion of public housing) affects the private de-
veloper’s optimal strategy, and further, the supply of public 
housing.
In this paper, an option-based model is established to 
capture the private developer’s optimal decision making in 
a PPP housing project. The model implications reveal that 
the public target (i.e. proportion of public housing) posi-
tively affects the waiting time to develop and project value. 
An increase in the proportion of public housing would 
induce a delay effect on project development. The private 
developer is willing to wait longer for a better environ-
ment in the face of a rise in public target. In particular, 
due to the concavity of the expected waiting time, the local 
government should not increase the proportion when the 
initial proportion is at a low level, if the government’s sup-
ply plan is sensitive to time. On the other hand, a change 
in the proportion of public housing has little impact on 
the supply of private housing.
The policy implications arising from this model are 
worth discussing. The private developer has different strat-
egy corresponding to different proportions of public hous-
ing in a PPP project. Although a rise in the proportion 
will not affect private housing supply in the long term, a 
higher proportion would delay the project development 
and thus reduce both the public and private supply in 
the short term. It indicates that the government should 
consider the trade-off between the waiting time and the 
supply of public housing. In addition, in many cases, the 
public sector enforces a limitation to the waiting time in 
housing project. This makes the PPP project with high 
proportion of public housing less attractive to the private 
developer despite of discounted cost of land. If there is 
no such limitation, the private developer is willing to take 
a higher proportion as it would lead to a higher project 
value, though the developer is expected to wait longer.
Notably, the analysis is derived from general case so 
that the implications are more universal and fundamental. 
The theoretical model can be extended in accordance with 
specific PPP schemes, market settings or regulations. That 
being said, the model requires an adaption when applying 
to a case of redevelopment or of new zoning. The option-
based model welcomes more intensive study and wider 
applications in more projects. In the future, the theoreti-
cal implications are expected to verify through empirical 
study by using data in reality.
Figure 4. The plot of the expected waiting time against the 
project value corresponding to the increasing proportion of 
public housing (lamda from 10% to 199%)
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